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Abstract
Executive compensation packages are often valued in an inconsistent manner: while
employee stock options (ESOs) are typically valued ex-ante, cash bonuses are valued
ex-post. This renders the existing valuation models of employee compensation packages
theoretically unsatisfactory and, potentially, empirically distortive. In this paper, we
propose an option-based framework for ex-ante valuation of cash bonus contracts. After
obtaining closed-form expressions for ex-ante values of several frequently used types of
bonus contracts, we utilize them to explore the e¤ects that the shape of a bonus contract
has on the executive’s attitude toward risk-taking. We, also, study pay-performance
sensitivity of such contracts. We show that the terms of a bonus contract can dramatically
impact both risk-taking behavior as well as pay-performance incentives. Several testable
predictions are made, and venues of future research outlined. Key words: Executive
Compensation, Cash Bonus, Incentives, Risk-Taking Behavior. Word count: 6602. JEL
classi…cation: J33; G13.
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11 Introduction
The compensation of top corporate executives is a popular topic of discussion in both business
and academic circles. Some of the more frequently discussed issues are: the most appropriate
structure and level of an executive compensation package, how the structure of a compensa-
tion package in‡uences managers’ attitudes toward risk-taking, and how the structure of the
compensation package relates to the …rm’s performance. Regarding the …rst issue, Holmstrom
(1979) argues that an optimal compensation contract should ensure the maximum expected
utility for the principal (the shareholders) while providing at least the reservation level of the
expected utility for the agent (the executive). This approach has subsequently been adopted in
the vast literature on the optimal principal-agent risk-sharing rules. The connection between
the structure of the compensation package and the agent’s attitude toward risk is explored,
for example, in Ross (1999) and Carpenter (2000). These papers show that, for a risk-averse
manager, adding a convex-shaped compensation contract does not always increase a man-
ager’s desire to take risk. The relationship between the level of the executive compensation
and the …rm’s performance is addressed in a seminal paper by Jensen and Murphy (1990) {see
also Garen (1994), and many follow-up papers}.1 The predictive power of such studies, and
their ability to test agency problems, is conditional upon the correct measurement of the level
and sensitivity of the compensation. In that respect, the valuation problem is primitive with
respect to the exploration of agency issues.
Compensation contracts are increasingly complex packages with an underlying option-like
structure (see Table 1).2
Underlying Asset Expiration Date Early Exercise
Base Salary Cash None N/A
Restricted Stock Stock None N/A
Cash Bonus Perf. measure(s) 1 year No
Long-Term Bonus Perf. measure(s) 3-6 years No
Stock Option Stock 10 years Yes
Table 1: The Underlying Option Structure of a Typical Executive Compensation Contract
It would seem natural, therefore, to value compensation contracts using option pricing
techniques. However, the valuation techniques used in the academic literature are often not self-
consistent: while employee stock option (ESO) grants are typically valued ex-ante, i.e., before
1Hermalin and Wallace (1999) and Murphy (1999) provide a comprehensive review of the literature on the
subject.
2The complexity of the compensation contracts is documented in Kole (1997), Murphy (1999), and Hermalin
and Wallace (1999), among others.
2uncertainties are resolved {see, for example, Carpenter (1998)}, cash bonuses are systematically
valued ex-post, i.e., by taking a discounted value of the realized cash grants. Such lack of
consistency can distort empirical results. A related, yet mostly overlooked problem is that when
ex-post valuation is utilized, pay-performance sensitivity measures such as the one introduced
in Jensen and Murphy (1990) {see Section 3.2 of the present paper for more details} are not
well de…ned.
Consistent use of ex-ante valuation for all components of a compensation package would
simultaneously resolve both of these problems and provide a natural framework for the analysis
of agency problems. Despite its obvious merits, ex-ante valuation of cash bonus grants has
not been explored in the literature until now, primarily because the ex-post approach is much
simpler to use in empirical studies.3 Ex-ante valuation requires knowledge of both the contract
structure (performance measures, the pay-for-performance relationship, etc.) and the proba-
bility distribution of the performance variables. Since the performance is typically measured
by accounting variables, that is not an easy task.
The aim of this paper is to initiate the development of an ex-ante valuation method for
cash bonus packages.4 More precisely, we perform an ex-ante valuation as if the executive’s
performance were measured by the company’s stock price, demonstrate how the shape of the
bonus contract in‡uences the executive’s attitude toward risk, and study the pay-performance
sensitivity of such contracts. We start by demonstrating that a typical executive bonus con-
tract with a linear incentive zone has a payo¤ structure equivalent to a portfolio of standard
and binary European call options (see Figure 1). As a result, under suitable assumptions
(see assumptions (1) to (6) in Section 2), the ex-ante contract value is given by the linear
combination of Black and Scholes and binary European call option prices (see, for example,
Wilmott (1998)), with the strike prices at the boundary points of the incentive zone. Assuming
that a risk neutral executive can choose the level of stock price volatility by selecting a set
of projects at origination, we show that only deeply out-of-the-money contracts and contracts
with a large incentive range (i.e., the large di¤erence between the maximum and the minimum
bonus payo¤s) motivate a risk-neutral executive to take a non-negligible level of risk. The
pay-performance sensitivity of a bonus package is, then, de…ned as the marginal change in
the ex-ante contract value in response to a small change in the performance measure (i.e., the
stock price). Our results are extended to bonus contracts with non-linear incentive zones, and
performance share contracts with vesting risk. Several testable predictions are made, and some
venues of future research outlined.
3Practitioners often use the expected or “target” bonus measure instead. That corresponds to an ex-ante
valuation if the convexity of the bonus contract payo¤ is ignored. We thank K. Murphy for pointing this out
to us.
4To the best of our knowledge, this is the …rst attempt to do so.
3This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the structure of a typical
cash bonus contract and obtain a closed-form expression for the value of a short-term bonus
contract with a linear incentive zone. Section 3 explores the impact of a cash bonus contract
on the executive’s risk-taking behavior and incentives. In Section 4, we extend our approach to
some other types of cash bonus contracts. Section 5 contains our conclusions and suggestions
for the future research. In the Appendix, the reader can …nd details of a proof.
2 The Incentive Schedule of a Typical Cash Bonus Con-
tract
The vast majority of executive bonus plans are based on an explicit incentive schedule.5 A
common shape of the incentive curve is presented on Figure 1:6 an executive receives an amount
Bl if the performance measure reaches the minimal value Ml; exceeding Ml increases the payo¤
to the executive in a linear fashion until it caps at Bu when the performance measure reaches
Mu.7 Table 2 demonstrates that the following portfolio: Bl long binary call options with a
strike price K = Ml,
Bu¡Bl
Mu¡Ml long standard European call options with the strike price K = Ml
and
Bu¡Bl
Mu¡Ml short standard European call options with the strike price K = Mu, replicates the
shape of the incentive curve on Figure 1. We shall refer to this portfolio as the replicating
option portfolio.
Payo¤ MT < Ml Ml · MT < Mu MT ¸ Mu
Binary options 0 Bl Bl
Long position in call option 0
Bu¡Bl
Mu¡Ml (MT ¡ Ml)
Bu¡Bl
Mu¡Ml (MT ¡ Ml)
Short position in call option 0 0 ¡
Bu¡Bl
Mu¡Ml (MT ¡ Mu)
Total 0 Bl +
MT¡Ml
Mu¡Ml (Bu ¡ Bl) Bu
Table 2: Replicating Option Portfolio Payo¤s
Throughout this paper we maintain the following set of assumptions : (1) the executive’s
performance is measured by the company’s stock price; (2) the executive is a risk-neutral
expected utility maximizer; (3) the compensation contract consists of a …xed salary and a
cash bonus contract; (4) there are no arbitrage opportunities; (5) the company’s stock is
5See Murphy (1998) and Murphy (1999). These articles utilize the survey provided in “Annual Incentive
Plan Design Survey” by Towers Perrin (1996-97).
6Among the compensation specialists, such bonus contract shape is known as the 80-120 Rule. The name
comes from the typical values (as percentages of the target performance) of the lower and the upper performance
bounds. See Murphy (1999).
7Convex as well as concave incentive zones are sometimes used as well. See Murphy (1998) and Section 4.1
for more details.
4traded continuously and without friction; and (6) the stock price follows a geometric Brownian
motion.
Assumption (3) is introduced in order to isolate the e¤ects of a bonus contract on the
executive’s risk-taking and pay-performance incentives. Real-life contracts usually have a
number of other components (see Table 1). Accounting for contract complexity is not di¢cult.
For example, while adding stock options would certainly change the risk-taking attitude of
a risk-neutral executive, we can still use the same method of analysis as the one outlined in
Section 3.8 Assumptions (4) to-(6) are standard in the option pricing literature and could
easily be relaxed.
Assumptions (1) and (2) are particularly important for tractability, even if not entirely
realistic.9 More speci…cally, assuming that company performance is measured by the company’s
stock price (assumption (1)) allows us to rely on the standard complete markets option pricing
techniques. In reality, performance in cash bonus contracts is primarily measured by accounting
variables.10 Using accounting variables instead of the stock price would complicate valuation
in two ways: probability distributions of the accounting variables are much less studied than
the probability distributions of stock prices; in addition, and perhaps more importantly, there
are no marketed securities with payo¤s perfectly correlated with accounting variables. As a
result, the standard option pricing techniques do not apply in a straightforward manner.11
Assumption (2) ensures that the company cost and the executive value of a compensation
package coincide. In reality, executives are likely to be risk averse. In that case, the company
cost, i.e., the amount of cash that a well-diversi…ed outside investor would be willing to pay
for such contingent claim, would be di¤erent from the value to the executive, i.e., the value
that a risk-averse executive places on the same contract.12 The cost to the company can be
obtained using the standard risk-neutral pricing techniques (see Section 2), while the value
to a risk-averse executive, is, in general, impossible to …nd in closed form (see Lambert et
al (1991) and Hall and Murphy (2000)). For a risk-neutral executive, however, the company
8For a risk-neutral executive, valuation of complex packages is additive {see Uroševi´ c (2000) for a uni…ed
framework for the ex-ante valuation of complex compensation packages}.
9In Martellini and Uroševi´ c (2001), we develop a consumption-based asset pricing model that allows us to
relax the assumptions (1)-(3) and value complex compensation grants, including cash bonus contracts, from a
risk-averse executive’s perspective, when performance is measured by either the stock price or an accounting
variable.
10Murphy (1998) reports that only …ve out of 177 contracts in his sample of the top U.S. companies used
the stock price as a performance measure, but always coupled with one or more accounting measures.
11In contrast, if the performance is measured in terms of the company’s stock price, the market is dynamically
complete and the standard option pricing methods apply {see Du¢e (1995), for example}.
12The main reason for the ine¢ciency is that, for an equity-based compensation contract, managers are
rewarded by the market only for the systematic and not for the company-speci…c component of the risk they
bear. The latter can be quite substantial for poorly diversi…ed managers.
5cost and the executive value of a compensation contract coincide. This simpli…es the problem
signi…cantly.
Since the company’s stock price St is assumed to be the sole performance measure, if the
incentive zone is linear, the bonus payo¤ at maturity of the contract T is given by the following
formula:
Payoff (T) = Bl1fST¸Slg +
Bu ¡ Bl
Su ¡ Sl
(max(ST ¡ Sl;0) ¡ max(ST ¡ Su;0)) (1)
When the shape of the incentive zone is linear, we denote the ex-ante value of the contract
by Vlin.13 Taking the discounted expectation of the payo¤ (Equation 1) with respect to the
risk-neutral probability measure, Vlin can be expressed in terms of the standard and binary
European call option prices:
Vlin = BlCB(S0;r;¾;T;K = Sl) +
Bu ¡ Bl
Su ¡ Sl
(C(S0;r;¾;T;K = Sl) ¡ C(S0;r;¾;T;K = Su))
(2)
where the expressions in Equation (2) read:14



















d2 = d1 ¡ ¾
p
T
Here, the current stock price is denoted as S0, r is the annual continuously compounded
risk-free rate of return, and ¾ is the stock price volatility.
3 The E¤ects of a Bonus Contract on the Executive’s
Risk-Taking Behavior and Incentives
Several papers discuss the e¤ects of the shape of the bonus contract (Figure 1) on executives’
motivation to manipulate the measures used in determining their bonus payo¤s (corporate
income, for example).15 The ex-ante valuation approach provides us with a natural framework
13In contrast, we use Vf to denote the ex-ante value of the bonus contract when the shape of the incentive
zone is given by a function f that may not be linear (see Section 4.1).
14See Wilmott (1998), for example.
15See Healy (1985), Gaver, Gaver, and Austin (1995), Holthausen, Larcker, and Sloan (1995), and Murphy
(1998).
6for addressing and quantifying agency problems. In particular, utilizing Equation 2, we show
that if performance is measured by the stock price, the shape of the bonus contract curve
plays an important role in shaping the executive’s attitude towards risk; it also in‡uences the
executive’s pay-performance sensitivity.
3.1 Impact on the Executive’s Risk-Taking Behavior
Since Jensen and Meckling (1976), several studies have analyzed the impact of executive com-
pensation contracts on the executive’s attitude toward risk taking. More recently, Ross (1999)
showed that adding a new contract into an executive’s contract package causes a change in
the executive’s attitude toward risk that can be broken down into three component e¤ects:
convexity, magni…cation and translation.16 In the case of a risk-neutral executive {assumption
(2)}, the translation and magni…cation e¤ects vanish. As a result, the incremental impact on
the executive’s risk attitude is purely determined by the shape (convexity) of the contract. In
this case, adding convexity to a contract leads to greater risk-taking on behalf of the executive.
Since a performance-based cash bonus contract has a relatively complex option structure, it
is natural to wonder what kind of attitude towards risk does granting a bonus contract gener-
ate. In order to facilitate such an analysis, we make the following, and …nal, assumption: (7)
The executive can control the stock price volatility by selecting a portfolio of projects at the
origination of the contract.17 From assumptions (1)-(7), it follows that the executive selects
an optimal level of volatility at the origination of the contract so as to maximize the ex-ante
value of her bonus contract. Note that, for simplicity, we are considering one-time volatil-
ity adjustments in this paper. Clearly, one could consider dynamic volatility adjustments,
instead18.
Let us introduce some useful concepts. Let us de…ne, for a compensation contract X, the
value function as the map ¾ ! VX (¾), i.e., a function that plots the ex-ante values of the
compensation contract for every level of volatility, ceteris paribus. We say that a contract X
leads to cautious behavior if lim¾!1 VX (¾) = 0 (otherwise, we call the executive’s behavior
non-cautious). If X leads to cautious behavior, a value maximizing executive who is granted
such contract would not have an incentive to increase volatility without bound. We say that
16For a risk-averse agent with decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) preferences, Ross (1999) shows that
adding a call option may actually increase her risk aversion. Similar, even if somewhat weaker, conclusions are
reached in a dynamic model by Carpenter (2000). She demonstrates that receiving a stock option compensation
grant would not lead a fund manager with a constant relative risk aversion (an example of DARA preferences)
to always seek greater risk.
17Johnson and Tian (2000a, 2000b) make the same assumption in analyzing risk-taking incentives generated
by employee stock option contracts. See, also, Jiang (2000) for a principal-agent model where the agent
privately and e¤ortlessly controls risk.
18Cadenillas et al (2001) price executive stock options allowing for dynamic volatility adjustments.
7a contract leads to non-trivial risk taking behavior if the value function is not monotonically
decreasing in volatility (otherwise, it leads to trivial risk-taking behavior). Finally, we say that
a contract leads to optimal risk-taking behavior if the corresponding value function has the
interior global maximum as a function of volatility (and suboptimal otherwise).19 Establishing
whether the bonus contract (Figure 1) leads to an optimal risk-taking behavior is, therefore,
equivalent to establishing whether the corresponding value function has a global maximum at
a non-zero, …nite level of volatility. When the global interior maximum exists and is reached
at ¾ = ¾¤, it is in the executive’s best interest to take up risk until ¾¤ is reached. Any further
increase (or decrease) in risk would decrease the ex-ante value of her contract. Thus, a rational
executive would choose would select a project that leads to ¾ = ¾¤. Clearly, contracts that
lead to non-cautious or trivial behavior cannot lead to optimal risk-taking behavior (in the
sense de…ned above).
3.1.1 Value Functions for Benchmark Contracts
In this section we determine the shape of the value functions for a set of benchmark contracts
which are the “building blocks” of a typical cash bonus contract (see Table 3).
Contract Type Payo¤ at Expiration Ex-ante Company Cost at Origination
Stock ST Vstock = S0
Binary Option Bl1fST¡Slg Vbinary = BlCB(S0;r;¾;T;K = Sl)
Stock Option max(ST ¡ Sl;0) Voption = C(S0;r;¾;T;K = Sl)
Unlimited Upside Potential Bl1fST¡Slg + max(ST ¡ Sl;0) Vunlim = BlCB(K = Sl) + C(K = Sl)
Table 3: Benchmark Contracts
In the case of a stock grant, the expression Vstock = S0 implies that
@Vstock
@¾ = 0 for every ¾.
In other words, the value function is ‡at. That, in turn, implies that the executive is indi¤erent
regarding any particular value of volatility, including the most extreme high or low values.
For the other benchmark contracts, it is useful to distinguish between the two types of
contracts: Type I contract, for which S0 < Sle¡rT, and the Type II contract, for which





¡ rT, then a contract for which a > 0
corresponds to a Type I, while a contract for which a · 0 corresponds to a Type II contract.
Depending upon the contract type, the desire to maximize the contract value may in‡uences
the executive’s attitude toward risk di¤erently. The following proposition states that Type I
contracts are worthless (ex-ante) for an executive who does not take any risk.
19Optimal risk-taking behavior does not have to be optimal in any other way; in particular, it can be
sub-optimal from the shareholders’ point of view (see Section 3.2).
8Proposition 1 For binary, stock option, unlimited upside, and general cash bonus contracts,
lim¾!0V = 0 for Type I contracts and lim¾!0V > 0 for Type II contracts.
P roof. The proofis immediate fromlim¾!0C = max(S0 ¡ K exp(¡rT);0) and lim¾!0CB =
e¡rT1S0¡Sle¡rT.
For Type I contracts, it would be in the executive’s best interest to undertake some risky
projects. Therefore, Type I contracts always lead to non-trivial risk-taking behavior. In
addition, for stock option contracts, the following proposition holds:
Proposition 2 a) lim¾!1 Voption = S0.
b) Voption (¾) is monotonically increasing as a function of ¾, for all ¾.





Notice that, in this context, a stock option contract leads to non-cautious risk taking.20
Namely, it would be optimal for an executive to take on in…nitely risky projects.21 In contrast,
for a binary contract, the following proposition holds:
Proposition 3 a) lim¾!1 Vbinary = 0 for both Type I and Type II contracts.
b) For Type I contract, the value function has a unique global interior maximum at ¾¤ = q
2a
T > 0; otherwise, the value function Vbinary (¾) is monotonically decreasing.







¾ , where n(:) is the standardized normal probability density function and










, Part b) of the Propo-
sition follows immediately.
Proposition 3 states that a binary contract leads to cautious behavior for both types of
contracts; Type I contracts also lead to the existence of aglobal interior maximum, or “optimal”
risk-taking behavior. On the other hand, since its upside potential is limited, a binary contract
does not provide an incentive for an executive to raise her performance above the performance
threshold.
The unlimited upside potential contract is, in e¤ect, a combination of a binary contract
and a stock option. In this case, the shape of the value function depends not only on the
relation between the current stock price and the lower bound, but also on the ratio b =
Bl
Sl,
i.e., the relative size of the award for reaching the threshold. The following proposition holds:
20See Johnson and Tian (2000a) and (2000b) for a detailed discussion.
21For a risk-averse executive, Proposition 2, part b) would no longer hold {see Hall and Murphy (2000b),
and Martellini and Uroševi´ c (2001)}.
9Proposition 4 a) lim¾!1 Vunlim = S0 for both contract types.
b) i) When a > 0 (Type I contract) and b · 2, Vunlim (¾) is monotonically increasing for
all ¾; if a > 0 and b > 2, a global interior maximum exists at ¾¤ =
q
2ab
(b¡2)T > 0; ii) when
a = 0, Vunlim (¾) is monotonically increasing if b < 2, a constant if b = 2, and monotonically
decreasing if b > 2; iii) when a < 0; Vunlim (¾) is monotonically decreasing if b ¸ 2 and has a
global interior minimum.























Notice that a contract with an unlimited upside potential always leads to cautious behavior
only when b > 2, i.e., when the reward for reaching the lower performance bound is su¢ciently
high with respect to the bound itself; only Type I contracts within that class lead to an optimal
risk-taking behavior.
We now turn to a similar analysis for the general cash-bonus contract (see Figure 1) which,
in contrast to the unlimited upside potential contract has an added performance cap feature.
3.1.2 The Value Function for a Cash-Bonus Contract
From Proposition 1 we know that Type I contracts are worthless (ex-ante) to an executive who
does not take any risk, while Type II contracts are not. We now demonstrate that, because
of the performance cap, a typical bonus contract (Figure 1) leads to cautious behavior for all
values of the relative award for reaching the threshold, b. In addition, the class of contracts
that induce “optimal” risk taking behavior is wider than for any of the benchmark contracts.
In order to prove this, let us introduce two subcategories for the Type II class of contracts:
those for which Sle¡rT < S0 · Sue¡rT (Type IIa contracts) and those for which S0 > Sue¡rT
(Type IIb contracts). The following proposition describes the shape of the value function:
Proposition 5 a) lim¾!1 Vlin = 0 for each contract type.
b) For a Type I contract, the value function has one extreme point, the global interior
maximum.
c) If S0 ¸ S¤ =
p
SuSle¡rT (i.e., for all Type IIb and some Type IIa contracts), the value
function is monotonically decreasing in volatility.
d) For a Type IIa contract where S0 < S¤, the shape of the value function depends on the
lower and upper bonus payo¤s, Bl and Bu.22 If Bl = 0, the value function has one extreme
point, the global interior maximum; if Bl 6= 0 and Bu ¡Bl is relatively “small” with respect to
22The values of S0; Sl, and Su are assumed to be …xed.
10Bl, the value function is a monotonically decreasing function of volatility;23 for intermediate
values of Bu ¡ Bl with respect to Bl, there are two extreme points, a local interior minimum
at ¾ = ¾min, and a local interior maximum at ¾ = ¾max; so that ¾min < ¾max. The maximum
is global for su¢ciently large values of Bu ¡ Bl with respect to Bl.
P roof. See the Appendix.
In Figures 2-5, we plot the value function for each contract type and for various values of
Bl (Bl = 0, 0:1, 0:2, 0:3).24 We have used the following set of parameters: T = 1; r = 5%;
Sl = 120; Su = 140 and Bu = :5. Let us refer to S0 = 107, 117, and 127 as the low,
intermediate, and high current stock price values corresponding to contract types I, IIa, and
IIb, respectively.25 From Proposition 5, part a), we infer that a rational executive would have
an incentive to be cautious in her risk-taking. In addition, we observe the following:
i) If the current stock price S0 is low, illustrated by the curve where S0 = 107 curve in
Figures 2-5, the contract leads to “optimal” risk-taking behavior (Proposition 5, part b). The
same is true for intermediate values of S0, when the executive is paid only if she outperforms
the lower bound (Proposition 5, part d)). This is illustrated by the curve where S0 = 117 in
Figure 2.
ii) For high values of the current stock price, illustrated by the curve where S0 = 127 in
Figures 2–5, the contract leads to trivial risk-taking behavior or, in other words, to complete
risk avoidance on the part of the executive (Proposition 5, part c)). The same is true for
intermediate values of the current stock price, when Bl > 0 and the incentive range Bu ¡ Bl
is relatively small with respect to Bl, as illustrated by the curve where S0 = 117 in Figure 5
(Proposition 5, part d)).
iii) The situation is more intricate for the intermediate values of the current price for which
S0 < S¤, as illustrated by S0 = 117 on Figures 3 and 4 (Proposition 5, part d)). When Bl
is positive, and Bu ¡ Bl is su¢ciently large with respect to Bl (Figure 3), there is a local
minimum and a global interior maximum. Thus, the contract leads to “optimal” risk-taking
behavior. In this case, after an initial decrease until ¾ = ¾min, the value function rises as
volatility increases, until a value ¾ = ¾max is reached. This point corresponds to the global
maximum of the value function. Thus, a rational executive would select ¾ = ¾max. In contrast,
for intermediate values of Bu¡Bl with respect to Bl (Figure 4), the internal maximum is only
local, and not global, so the contract in this case leads to trivial risk-taking behavior (i.e., the
executive does not undertake any risky projects at all).
23We use quotation marks for “small” since Bu ¡ Bl does not have to be small with respect to Bl in an
absolute sense; in our illustration, when S0 = 117; Sl = 120, and Su = 140, the contract induces trivial
risk-taking behavior, for example, even when Bl = 1 and Bu ¡ Bl = 0:95.
24Fixing Bl and changing Bu leads to qualitatively similar results as long as Bl > 0.
25That follows from Sl exp(¡rT) ¼ 114:15 , Su exp(¡rT) ¼ 133:17 , and S¤ =
p
SuSle¡rT ¼ 123:93.
11From Proposition 5, it follows that the contracts that cause the executive to take non-
zero, …nite, amounts of risk are either deeply out of the money (Type I contracts), or not
so deeply out of the money but such that the executive receives little or no payment at the
lower bound with respect to the incentive range (Type IIa contracts with S0 < S¤ and low Bl
with respect to Bu ¡ Bl). Other contract types lead to complete risk avoidance on the part
of the executive, and therefore should not be often observed in practice. These are important
testable predictions.26
3.2 Pay-Performance Sensitivity
An important advantage of ex-ante valuation is that it allows one to properly de…ne the
notion of the pay-performance sensitivity of a bonus contract. In contrast, if the value of a
bonus contract is measured ex-post, the pay-performance sensitivity cannot be determined and
therefore has to be assumed to take certain value (see Section 4.2 for a speci…c example).
From Jensen and Murphy (1990), we recall that the pay-performance sensitivity of a com-
pensation contract is a measure of the impact of a marginal change in the performance measure
(in our case, the stock price S0) on the contract value or, in other words, the contract “delta”.
For the linear cash bonus contract, this de…nition leads to the following expression:
@Vlin
@S0
= Bl±B(K = Sl) +
Bu ¡ Bl
Su ¡ Sl
(±(K = Sl) ¡ ± (K = Su)) (5)














In Figure 6, we plot the contract value as a function of S0. We observe that the contract
values monotonically increase in S0, ceteris paribus. Algebraically, this follows from that
fact that ± is a decreasing function of K; and ±B is non-negative. In other words, the pay-
performance sensitivity of a bonus contract is positive, as expected.
It is interesting to note that the scaled values of
@Vlin
@S0 , i.e., 2
@Vlin
@S0 =(Bl + Bu), are relatively
small for reasonable values of the parameters, and are typically much smaller than the corre-
sponding option ± ´ @C
@S0 = N (d1).28 While more careful analysis is needed, this likely implies
26For a risk-averse executive, one would expect the class of sub-optimal contracts to shrink, making Type II
contracts more likely {see Martellini and Uroševi´ c (2001)}.
27See, for example, Willmott (1998).
28Varying the set of plausible parameters, we obtained a scaled value of cash bonus sensitivity typically less
than 0:1 (and mostly around 0:02 ¡ 0:04).
12that bonus contracts have less pay-performance sensitivity than stock option contracts (and
certainly less than the stock grants themselves). If this is true, why would one ever use a
bonus package instead of stock options? The answer to this question could lie, in part, in
the “optimal” risk-taking behavior implied by the bonus contract (Proposition 5), vis-a-vis
non-cautious risk-taking behavior implied by the stock option contract (Proposition 2).
Let us end this sub-section by de…ning the agency problem which is potentially quite
important. In general, the value of ¾ that is optimal for the shareholders {argmax¾
@Vlin
@S0 (¾)}
does not coincide with the value of ¾ that is optimal for the executive {argmaxVlin (¾)}. An
“optimal” bonus contract, if it exists, would use the values of contract parameters that would
achieve the optimal trade-o¤ between the shareholders’ and the executive’s interests.
3.3 The Impact of Contract Terms on Ex-Ante Valuation
Let us now consider how changes in the contract terms set by the board of directors, namely,
Bl, Bu, Sl and Su, in‡uence the ex-ante value of the contract. The following proposition holds:
Proposition 6 a) Increases in Bl and Bu raise the value of the contract, while increases in
Sl and Su lower the value of the contract, ceteris paribus.
b) lim
Su!Sl
Vlin = BuCB(S0;r;¾;T;K = Sl).
P roof. The results of this Proposition followimmediately fromthe convexity and monotonic-
ity of C(K), as well as the fact that CB(K = Sl) = ¡ @
@KC(K)jK=Sl.
Intuitively, part a) of the Proposition says that increasing contractual payo¤s, ceteris
paribus, makes the executive better o¤; in contrast, raising their “performance plank” makes
it less likely that the bonus will be paid, thus making the executive worse o¤, ceteris paribus.
Part b) of the Proposition states that when the incentive domain Su ¡ Sl is very small the
contract essentially becomes just the binary option.
In addition, as Table 4 demonstrates, an increase in the incentive range Bu ¡Bl raises the
optimal level of risk that the executive would take.29
Bu ¡ Bl 0:1 0:2 0:3 0:4 0:5
¾¤ for S0 = 107 40% 44% 47% 51% 54%
¾¤ for S0 = 117 0% 0% 20% 27% 33%
¾¤ for S0 = 127 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Table 4: Contract Value Arg Max as a Function of the Incentive Range
29Here, T = 1, r = 5%, Sl = 120, Su = 140; Bu = :5; while Bl varies from 0 to 0:4. Qualitatively similar
conclusions are reached if Bl is …xed and Bu varies, provided Bl > 0.
13When an interior local minimum exists (for intermediate values of S0), ¾min decreases
when the incentive range increases, as can be seen from Table 5. Therefore, an increase in the
incentive range widens the spread between ¾max and ¾min.
Bu ¡ Bl 0:1 0:2 0:3 0:4 0:5
¾min none none 6% 4% 0%
Table 5: Contract Value ArgMin as a Function of the Incentive Range
A similar analysis for the change in pay-performance sensitivity with respect to changes in
the contract terms can easily be performed.
4 The Valuation of More General Cash Bonus Contracts
In the previous sections, we only considered short-term bonus contracts with linear incentive
zones (Figure 1). In this section we show how to value contracts with non-linear incentive
zones as well as performance shares with vesting risk. We also provide an illustration of the
potential magnitude of the di¤erence between the ex-post and ex-ante value of a cash bonus
contract.
4.1 Non-linear Incentive Zones
While a majority of cash bonus contracts have a linear incentive zone, there are also contracts
with concave or convex incentive zones (see Figure 7).30
In that case, the contractual payo¤ at expiration depends on the terminal stock price ST
through an increasing convex (concave) function f (ST):
Payo¤(T) = Bl1fST¸Slg +
Bu ¡ Bl
f (Su) ¡ f (Sl)
[max(f (ST) ¡ f (Sl);0) ¡ max(f (ST) ¡ f (Su);0)]
(6)
so that the expression for the contract value reads:
Vf = e
¡rTE
Q (Payo¤(T)) = BlCB(S0;r;¾;T;K = Sl)
+
Bu ¡ Bl
f (Su) ¡ f (Sl)
[Cf(S0;r;¾;T;K = f (Sl)) ¡ Cf(S0;r;¾;T;K = f (Su))]
Here, CB is a binary call option price {see Equation (3)}, and
Cf = e
¡rTE
Q(max(f (ST) ¡ K;0)) (7)
30See Murphy (1998).
14Proposition 7 If f is convex, Vf · Vlin; if f is concave, Vf ¸ Vlin.
P roof. The result follows from Jensen’s inequality.
Intuitively, a contract with a convex incentive zone is never more valuable to an executive
than an otherwise identical contract with a linear incentive zone; the opposite is true for a
contract with a concave incentive zone. Let us specialize to f (ST) = S2
T (Figure 7). In this
case, ex-ante value of the cash bonus contract, denoted by V2; reads:
































d2 = d1 ¡ ¾
p
T
d3 = d1 + ¾
p
T
A comparative statics analysis can be performed just like in the case of the linear incentive
zone (Section 3). In particular, one can show that, upon substituting Vlin ! V2, Proposition
1, Proposition 5 {Parts a) and b)} and Proposition 6 remain valid. This, in part, implies that
when the incentive domain Su ¡ Sl is su¢ciently small, the executive’s attitude towards risk
will depend only on the values of the boundary points and not on the shape of the incentive
zone. At the limit, the shape of the value function for V2 is virtually identical to the shape of
the value function for Vlin (the same is true for a general concave or convex f).
On the other hand, from Figure 8, one can see that when the incentive domain Su ¡ Sl
is not very small, the shape of the incentive zone can signi…cantly in‡uence the executive’s
attitude towards risk. Here, a Type IIb contract is plotted. In this case, the executive facing a
linear incentive zone will avoid taking any risk (Proposition 5, part c), while her counterpart
facing a contract with the convex zone will optimally select a non-zero level of risk.
Utilizing Equation 8, it is not di¢cult to show that pay-performance sensitivity {see Jensen




Therefore, contracts with convex incentive zones do not improve pay-performance incentives
when compared to contracts with linear incentive zones, ceteris paribus. They do, however,
increase the likelihood that in-the-money contracts will be “optimal” from the executive’s
standpoint. The argument reverses when the incentive zone is concave.
154.2 The Valuation of Performance Share Contracts
Performance share contracts are discussed, for example, in Conyon and Murphy (2000).31
These contracts promise to deliver a number of company shares at maturity, conditional on
the executive’s meeting the performance threshold and vesting requirement. Such contracts
di¤er from the standard cash bonus in two ways: …rst, the payo¤ is in shares rather than in
cash; second, since the contract length is usually three to six years, vesting risk becomes an
issue.
Performing an ex-post valuation for the performance share packages of British executives,
Conyon and Murphy (2000) assume that the pay-performance sensitivity of such contracts is
equal to one, independently of the contract features. An ex-ante valuation approach allows us
to obtain an exact analytical expression for the pay-performance sensitivity of such contracts.
The simplest performance share contract promises the delivery, at maturity, of one share of the
company’s stock if a performance target has been met and the executive stays in the company.
If the performance threshold is Sl, the contract payo¤ at maturity is:
Payo¤(T) = ST1fST¸Slg = Sl1fST¸Slg + max(ST ¡ Sl;0)
and the contract value, at origination, is equal to (here we, for simplicity, assume that the
executive stays in the company with certainty):
V = SlCB(S0;r;¾;T;K = Sl) + C(S0;r;¾;T;K = Sl) = S0N (d1(K = Sl)) (9)
From Equation (9), it is easy to check that the pay-performance sensitivity of the contract
is @V
@S0 = N (d1(K = Sl)) +
n(d1(K=Sl)) p
¾2T . In Figure 9, we plot @V
@S0 for various values of volatility
and the performance target. We point out that @V
@S0 can be well below one, as well as well
above one. In light of this, arbitrarily …xing the performance sensitivity of such contract to
unity certainly does not seem innocuous.
More generally, in a linear performance shares contract, the contract delivers Ll shares
of the company stock if the performance measure reaches the minimal value Sl; exceeding
Sl increases the number of shares in a linear fashion until it caps at Lu shares, when the
performance measure reaches Su. Since the contract payo¤ at maturity is:
Payo¤(T) = LlST1fST¸Slg +
Lu ¡ Ll
Su ¡ Sl
ST (max(ST ¡ Sl;0) ¡ max(ST ¡ Su;0))
the value of a linear incentive zone performance shares contract is given by the following
31Performance share contracts are very common in the UK, where they are often called “Long-Term Incentive
Plans”.
16expression:














S0(SuN (d1(K = Su)) ¡ SlN (d1(K = Sl)))
From this expression, one can easily discern the optimal risk-taking behavior of the execu-
tive, as well as the pay-performance incentive of the contract.
For long term contracts like this, with a maturity date three to six years from origination,
the vesting risk, i.e., the risk related to the possibility of the executive’s premature depar-
ture, can be very substantial. Incorporating vesting risk into the performance share contract
valuation can be done in the manner similar to ESO valuation, namely, by introducing an
executive’s departure hazard rate ¸t.32 The probability that the executive will stay in the






.33 In order to
value such contracts one proceeds in two steps. First, the contract value is determined as if
vesting occurs with certainty, using the same techniques as the above. Then, the result is
multiplied by the probability of the executive’s stay. How signi…cant is the second factor? As
a numerical example, let ¸ be a constant equal to 0:25, which corresponds to an executive’s
expected stay of four years. If T = 3 years, the probability of staying in the company until
vesting is lower than 50%. Therefore, the vesting risk makes the contract less than half as
valuable than it would be if the contract were to vest immediately, ceteris paribus. Clearly,
ignoring vesting risk can lead to a substantial overestimation of the contract value.
4.3 Ex-ante Versus Ex-post Valuation
It is a common practice in most, if not all, empirical studies on the subject of executive
compensation to use the ex-post instead of ex-ante values of cash bonus contracts. If the
contract paid o¤ the maximum allocated amount Bu, an ex-post value would overestimate the
real (ex-ante) value of the package.34 The ratio
Vlin
Bue¡rT is a measure of an upper limit of such
overestimation. Table 6 shows this ratio for di¤erent values of the parameters.35
We observe that the ratio is, in general, signi…cantly less than one but greater than zero. If
the bonus ends up out of the money, the ex-post contract value would be zero. Its ex-ante (real)
value, on the other hand, is greater than zero. While it is an open empirical question whether
under- and overestimation cancel each other out on average, depending on the di¤erent share
32See Jennergren and Naslund (1993), Cuny and Jorion (1995) or Carr and Linetsky (1999).
33Here, we assume that the timing risk is not priced and that probability of departure does not depend on
the executive’s performance. Relaxing these assumptions is possible {see El Karoui and Martellini (2000)}.
34Neglecting the vesting risk can cause additional overestimation.
35We use the same set of parameters as in Tables 3 and 4.
17Bu ¡ Bl 0:1 0:2 0:3 0:4 0:5
Vlin
Bue¡rT for S0 = 107 0.245 0.266 0.287 0.309 0.330
Vlin
Bue¡rT for S0 = 117 0.368 0.392 0.417 0.441 0.465
Vlin
Bue¡rT for S0 = 127 0.494 0.519 0.544 0.569 0.594
Table 6: Ex-Ante Versus Ex-Post Value
price scenarios, it is clear that the common practice of using ex-post cash bonus values may
potentially lead to substantial mis-speci…cation in empirical studies.
In the absence of a complete empirical bonus valuation method, it may actually make sense
to use the expected, rather than realized, payo¤s of the bonus package, adjusting them where
needed for the possibility of the executive’s departure.36 One should bear in mind, however,
that even in this case a well-de…ned pay-performance sensitivity measure does not exist. For
that, we do need an ex-ante formula.
5 Conclusion
Techniques used in the literature for valuingcompensation packages are often notself-consistent:
while cash bonuses are valued ex-post, i.e., by taking a discounted value of the realized cash
grants, employee stock options (ESOs) are valued ex-ante, i.e., before uncertainties are resolved.
From a theoretical point of view, ex-ante valuation has several advantages: it is forward look-
ing; it incorporates in principle all relevant risk factors; it utilizes well-known option pricing
methods; and it provides a useful framework for analyzing agency problems. This last point is
quite signi…cant, yet typically overlooked: pay-performance sensitivity measures, such as the
one discussed in Jensen and Murphy (1990) for stock options simply cannot be well-de…ned if
the performance is measured ex-post. Despite its obvious merits, the topic of the ex-ante val-
uation of cash bonus grants has been unexplored in the literature until now, primarily because
the ex-post approach is much simpler, even if not entirely correct, to use in empirical studies
The aim of this paper is to initiate the development of a comprehensive (ex-ante) valuation
framework for the cash bonus contracts, a missing link in developing a consistent valuation
approach towards valuing executive grants. We …rst remark that a typical executive cash bonus
package has a payo¤ structure equivalent to that of a portfolio of European call and binary
call options. If the performance of a risk-neutral executive is measured by the company stock
price, the value of a bonus package is the amount that a well-diversi…ed outside investor would
be willing to pay for such a contingent claim. Under the standard set of assumptions, the value
36Variants of an such approach are commonly used among compensation practitioners. Even though such
speci…cation neglects the underlying option structure of a contract, it seems better than discounting the realized
values.
18of such grant can be expressed as a linear combination of Black and Scholes calls and binary
call prices, with the strike prices equal to the boundary points of the incentive zone.
The existence of a closed-form solution facilitates comparative statics analysis and the
exploration of the related agency problems. Assuming that an executive can in‡uence the
stock price volatility by selecting di¤erent projects at origination, we show that when the
incentive zone is linear, only deeply-out-of-the-money contracts and contracts with a large
incentive range (i.e., a large di¤erence between the maximum and minimum bonus payo¤s)
motivate the manager to take non-zero (and …nite) levels of risk. We determine an analytical
expression for the pay-performance sensitivity of a contract with a linear incentive zone. This
quantity is always positive and, for a range of reasonable values of parameters, quite small in
comparison with the pay-performance sensitivity ofa stock option. In addition, we demonstrate
that ex-ante and ex-post valuation techniques may potentially lead to very di¤erent results.
We generalize our discussion to bonus contracts with non-linear incentive zones. After
demonstrating that, ceteris paribus, contracts with a convex (concave) incentive zone are always
less (more) valuable than contracts with a linear incentive zone, we show by way of an example
that the shape of the incentive zone can in‡uence the executive’s risk-taking behavior when
the incentive domain (i.e., the di¤erence between the upper and lower performance bounds)
is su¢ciently large. We, also, consider contracts where the payment is not in cash, but in
company stock (the so-called performance share contracts).
Ex-ante valuation is the natural framework for valuing contracts with vesting risk. We show
that long-term cash bonus contracts with vesting risk have smaller values than corresponding
contracts with no vesting risk. This raises additional concerns that the commonly used ex-
post bonus valuation techniques, plagued by some “survivorship” bias, may lead to serious
mis-speci…cation problems.
All this points to the need for development of the ex-ante valuation techniques, as well as
learning how to apply them e¤ectively in empirical studies. Before a practical procedure for
the ex-ante valuation of cash-bonus contracts can be completely established, it is necessary to
address several important issues that have been omitted in this paper. Since most cash bonus
contracts measure performance using accounting variables, an ex-ante valuation method for
this case must be developed …rst. It would be, also, desirable to obtain a better understanding
of the di¤erence between the value of a compensation package for an poorly diversi…ed, risk-
averse manager and the cost to a well-diversi…ed shareholder of the company.37
At the end of Section 3.2., we outlined an agency problem related to bonus contracts: the
trade-o¤ (in general) between the maximal pay-performance incentive, and the optimal risk
level that an unconstrained executive would take. An analysis similar to that found in Hall and
37See Martellini and Uroševi´ c (2001) for an attempt to address these questions within a standard
consumption-based dynamic asset pricing model.
19Murphy (2000) for the optimal stock option exercise price could be used to determine the set
of contract parameters that ensure the optimal trade-o¤ between the two opposing interests.
In addition, we have excluded from consideration in this paper other contract types, such as
stock options.
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217 Appendix
Part a) in Proposition 1 follows from lim¾!1 C = S0 and lim¾!1 C = S0B = 0 since, in
this case, the present value of the minimal bonus component vanishes, while the standard call
components cancel each other out. A change in stock price volatility a¤ects the value function
through the cash bonus vega:
@V
@¾
= Bl#B(K = Sl) +
Bu ¡ Bl
Su ¡ Sl
(#(K = Sl) ¡ #(K = Su)) (10)

















sign(#B) = ¡sign(d1(K = Sl)) (11)
sign(#(K = Sl) ¡ #(K = Su)) = ¡sign(x)









Part c) is immediate from Equation 11 since, if S0 ¸ S¤ =
p









T for every ¾, which in turn implies that x ¸ 0 and d1(K = Sl) > 0.
From Proposition 1 and Equations 10 and 11, it follows that @V
@¾ < 0 for all ¾. The proof of
parts b) and d) are very similar.
38See Willmott (1998).
39Inequality #(K = Sl) > #(K = Su) implies that n(K = Sl) > n(K = Su) , which in turn implies that
d2
1 (K = Su)¡d2
1 (K = Sl) > 0; which can be easily seen to imply x < 0. Conversely, #(K = Sl) < #(K = Su)
implies that x > 0.
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